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ABSTRACT 
The geo-political economy of oil exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa are 
mainly affected by abundant oil resources, semi-arid climate, and rapidly growing population. The 
interplay of agricultural policies for self-sufficiency, food imports, and oil prices have shaped the 
food security situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This paper explores the dynamic and causality 
linkage between external factors (e.g. oil prices) and internal factors (e.g. domestic food production). 
In particular, the causality relationships among domestic wheat production, wheat imports, and oil 
prices in Iran for 1964 to 1991 are examined. The results show that there is a unidirectional 
"Granger Causality" relation from oil price to wheat imports. This suggests that "past and present" 
history of oil prices and domestic production of wheat are useful information to improve prediction of 
wheat imports. But the past history of domestic production of food (wheat) alone cannot improve 
prediction of food imports. 
The implications of these results are significant in the context of food availability in Iran. Also, 
the expected agricultural policy reforms under GATT will further expose Iranian agriculture to 
instability from its macroeconomy as well as from the world economy. The findings in this study 
about the dynamic interaction of external and internal variables with food security might be useful in 
predicting possible consequences of GAIT reform. 
Key Words: oil price, food security, food self-sufficiency, GATT, wheat imports 
OIL PRICES AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN IRAN 
Iran, with an area of 1,468,195 square kilometers, has a total farmland area of 17 million 
hectares (II percent of the country), of which about 32 percent or 5.5 million hectares was not 
cultivated in 1990. Of the 11.5 million hectares under cultivation, about 50 percent or 5.6 million 
hectares are irrigated, including one million hectares in orchards (Kavossi, 1991). Given climate 
constraints, agricultural policies in Iran can be viewed as important economically and politically in the 
economic development of the country. The agricultural sector employs a large portion of the 
population and is an important source of food for the people. The objectives of agricultural policies 
after the Islamic Revolution in 1979 were to increase output, improve productivity and achieve food 
self-sufficiency. These are different from pre-revolution objectives not only in direction but also in 
means. 
After 1979, the agricultural sector of Iran-in spite of remarkable increases in the use of inputs 
such as fertilizers and farm machinery, and government emphasis on self-sufficiency (especially in 
wheat, Table I)-experienced disappointing performance. The average annual growth rate in gross 
domestic product (GOP) of agriculture for 1965-80 was 4.5 percent and for 1980-90 was 4.0 percent. 
Also, the population growth rate for those periods were 3.2 percent and 3.4 percent (World Bank 
1987, 1992). Iran is not an exception in the region for the poor performance in agricultural policies. 
Rapidly escalating food demand and sluggish supply response in Middle Eastern and North African 
countries have made the area one.jlf the least food self-sufficient regions in the world. The 
emergence of this "food gap" does not mean (as some have implied) that agricultural supply has 
stagnated, although this has happened in some cases. Rather, it means the measures taken to reduce 
the inequality between the rate of growth of demand and domestic supply and to restore food 
self-sufficiency have failed (Richards and Waterbury, 1990) (Table 2). 
In searching for the causes of this "food gap" in Iran, we select wheat as a strategic agricultural 
product and as a proxy for food to analyze pricing policy and to explore the incentive role of 
producer prices in the wheat production-consumption gap. A major point of contention in the 
agricultural policy debate in Iran centers on the influence of oil prices on food production, 
consumption, imports, and self-sufficiency in food. On the one hand, it is argued that oil price 
Commedity 
Fertilizer 
Wheat 
Table 1 Iranian government subsidies by Commodities for 1980/81 to 1989/90 
1980/81 
14.6 
3.7 
1981182 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
(billions of Iranian rials) 
20.0 27.0 25.3 27.8 22.0 20.5 19.0 18.3 
24.0 37.0 24.3 27.0 51.0 68.3 40.2 39.0 
SOURCE : The Ministry of Economy and Finance, Iran ( 1990 ). 
Table 2 Characteristics of grain imports, production, and food self-sufficiency 
1966-80 growth in 1981-85 growth in Self-sufficiency ratio 
Oil Exporting imports ·· Production Imports Production 1970 1975 1980 1985 
Countries 
Percent per year Percent 
Algeria 13.1 1.5 7.6 8.3 77 79 48 45 
Egypt 2.7 1.5 9.2 2.2 79 59 49 42 
Iran 8.3 1.8 1.3 0.1 90 79 65 59 
Iraq 20.8 -2.2 9.8 -2.3 89 52 44 28 
S. Aarabia 14.1 -3.6 8.9 48.5 46 25 7 28* 
Syria 8.7 6.7 7 -5.9 54 97 107 66 
Tunisia 6.5 7.1 -7.4 12.9 56 78 54 85 
*Saudi Arabia was self-sufficent in wheat by 1984. 
SOURCE : Shapouri and Rosen, 1986. 
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increases lead to increased food imports, which in turn causes an adverse impact on domestic 
production. Others argue that shortfalls in domestic production, independent of oil price changes, are 
the cause of the increasing trend in food imports. In a later section, the empirical evidence for the 
direction of causality and dynamic linkages between variables influencing the wheat 
consumption-production gap are examined. 
Oil Prices and Wheat Gap 
To analyze the implication of the "oil shocks" in the wheat sector, we examine the domestic 
supply and demand and then turn to the consequences of the resulting escalating of wheat imports. 
After the first oil shock in 1973-74, the Iranian government relied on oil revenue to finance 
agricultural imports and the share of agriculture in total government investment was reduced. In 
1974, Iran produced 4.6 million tons of wheat and imported 789,000 tons. This wheat 
consumption-production gap was party due to the Shah's land reform program, and was expected. 
This gap continued to widen and was mostly met through an increase in imports (Figure 1). 
There are two ways to increase agricultural production: ( 1) increase planted area (bring new 
land into cultivation), and (2) raise the productivity of the existing planted area. Increasing yields 
have played an important role in expanding the domestic supply of wheat in Iran and the entire 
region. For the 1970s and 1980s in the Middle East and North Africa, some 55 percent of the 
growth in food output was the result of increased yields, whereas extension of cultivated area explains 
the remaining 45 percent. During the era of oil boom (1973-80), some 88 percent of output growth 
was caused by higher yields (Khaldi 1984). 
In Iran, wheat production had an upward trend (except for 1978 and 1981), in spite of a 
decrease in area under wheat production from 6,325 hectares in 1974 to 6,192 hectares in 1983. This 
inverse trend indicates that the decrease in area was more than compensated by the increase in yield 
from 727 kilograms per hectare in 1974 to 1,076 kilograms per hectare in 1983. The yield increase 
was partly due to the use of improved seed and fertilizer that were made available to the farmers at 
subsidized prices, which were largely financed by oil revenues. From 1974 to 1991, wheat 
production in Iran increased from 4.7 million tons to 8.315 million tons. As Table 3 reports, wheat 
production, which grew steadily before the Revolution, has experienced some fluctuation since 1979, 
mainly due to severe drought in 1979-80 and 1983, and to unusually favorable weather conditions in 
1985-86. From the food security point of view, the variation of agricultural production in general, 
and cereal production in particular, was high during oil shock periods, such as 1973-85. The 
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Table 3 Iranian wheat production, consumption, and Imports 
Production Consumption Per Capita Imports 
Year Consumption 
....... mmt ..................... Kg mmt 
1974 4.700 5.750 180 1.452 
1975 5.500 5.790 176.4 1.466 
1976 5.965 5.349 158.7 0.737 
1977 5.500 5.926 168.5 1.159 
1978 5.526 5.926 162.8 0.73 
1979 5.946 5.884 155.6 0.4 
1980 5.744 6.148 156.5 0.871 
1981 6.610 7.131 174.7 1.615 
1982 6.660 8.162 192.4 1.769 
1983 5.956 7.878 178.8 2.683 
1984 6.706 7.533 164.4 2.618 
1985 6.630 8.276 173.8 2.144 
1986 7.577 8.482 171.6 1.831 
1987 7.600 11.031 200.8 3.712 
1988 7.265 10.715 200.2 3.423 
1989 5.511 10.610 199.7 5.312 
1990 7.000 11.750 200 4.818 
1991 8.315 12.746 200 4.521 
SOURCES : Ministry of Agriculture (Iran). Extracted from Haqverdi (Farsi) 1992 
The data for 1989 to 1991 were obtained from FAO sources . 
. 
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average growth rate for cereal was 3.71, and the standard deviation was 10.98. In per capita terms 
they were .67 and 10.67, respectively. Wheat production in the 1987 to 1991 period showed 
remarkable growth (except for 1989/90), but with accompanying high fluctuation due to scant rainfall 
in many parts of the country during the late 1980s. In the same period, despite the limited 
availability of cultivable land, the area under food grains production, of which 73 percent is devoted 
to wheat, increased by about 2.5 percent annually. In addition, more resources were allocated to 
agriculture after the Iran-Iraq war. And other institutional factors, such as incentives provided 
through producer price policy, also may have contributed to this upward trend in wheat production in 
the most recent period. Indeed, the growth of agricultural output in Middle Eastern countries is 
better than that of some other developing countries. But the point is that the agriculture sector still 
lags behind in relation to the growth in the demand for agricultural products. In other words, the 
problem in the region is not of stagnation or declining output, as is often the case in other developing 
countries, but rather a demand growth that exceeds the supply growth. 
All estimates of the food demand-supply balance in the region agree that demand will continue 
to grow rapidly (see, for example, FAO, and Khaldi). On the demand side, Khaldi found that total 
annual staples consumption grew at 4.8 percent from 1973 to 1980, while the rate for oil exporting 
countries in the region was 6.2 percent per year. Among others, there are three major determinants 
of demand growth: population growth, per capita income growth, and the income elasticity of 
demand. Due to data limitation for individual countries, this analysis focuses on food consumption of 
oil exporting countries in the region. Apart from sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle Eastern and North 
African countries have the highest population growth rate of any region in the world. Rapid 
population growth did make a substantial contribution to increased demand for food. However, much 
of the growth in demand has been caused by expansion of per capita incomes (Richards, 1987) (Table 
4). The population effect was compounded duringthe.oil boom decades by rapid income growth. 
Even for cereals for direct food consumption in the region, income growth accounted for roughly 25 
percent of the growth of consumption. Cereal demand as a whole grew much more rapidly, largely 
as a result of soaring demand for feeding animals. The changing composition of diets in the region 
came from higher incomes from the oil boom. Based on structural changes in food consumption and 
some political considerations, there is some evidence (Shapouri and Rosen, 1986;. Gardner, 1986) that 
food consumption in oil exporting countries in the region continues to increase despite a decline in 
income. So there is unlikely to be any reduction in the food consumption-production gap, at least in 
short run, from the demand side. Wheat consumption in Iran increased from 5.75 mmt in 1974/5 to 
Table 4 Source of food consumption growth, by 
commodity group for the oil exporting countries in MENA 
Staples 
Cereal 
Animal 
Products 
Notes: 
Region 
Oil Exp. 
Region 
Oil Exp. 
Region 
Oil Exp. 
g = growth of consumption 
Food 
............................. 
g %y 
3.6 25 
5.1 39 
3.6 25 
5.1 39 
Total 
................ 
g %y 
6.8 60 
12.7 76 
Feed All Uses 
······························ 
............................... 
g %y g %y 
6.8 60 4.8 44 
9.4 67 6.2 50 
6.9 61 4.9 45 
9.4 67 6.2 52 
Chicken Milk 
.............................. ........................... 
g %y g %y 
14.0 81 5.1 47 
20.8 85 9.3 66 
% y = percent of growth of consumption caused by income growth,using the formula 
g = n + y e, where n = poplation growth rate , and e = income elasticity of demand. 
Oil exporting countries are : Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, libya, Oman, and Saudi Arabia." 
Annual population growth rate in oil exporting countries is 3.1 percent. 
SOURCE: Richards, 1986. 
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12,746 llUllt in 1991/2. Even after oil prices started to decline in 1986, the consumption trend 
continued upward. 
The first response to this food production-consumption gap by govermnents was to increase food 
imports. For two decades, from 1960 to 1980, the region's food imports increased about 12 percent 
per year. There were four economic reasons for the import boom in the region. First, domestic 
production was (and is) highly unstable because of erratic rainfall. Second, the barter terms of trade 
moved sharply in favor of oil exporters/food importers. In 1970 a barrel of oil would buy roughly 
one bushel of wheat; by 1980 the same barrel could buy six bushels. Even in 1986, after the drop in 
oil prices, a barrel of oil was worth three bushels of wheat. Third, most MENA countries had ample 
supplies of foreign exchange; in other words, the balance of payments did not constrain food imports 
in the 1970s. Fourth, since most wheat importers in the region are small relative to the size of the 
international market, increased purchases have no impact on world price. Finally, in some countries 
urban-consumer tastes shifted away from local grains toward bread wheat, whose production was 
sometimes locally difficult (Richards and Waterbury, 1990). 
In all countries in the region increases in export earnings and/or credit led to increased imports 
of agricultural products during the 1970s. After 1980, the situation changed. The annual rate of 
increase in export earnings decreased from 21.0 to -1.9 in Algeria, from 20.4 to 1.6 in Iran, and 
from 31.1 to -28.8 in Saudi Arabia, between the 1966-80 period and the 1981-85 period. Total 
imports declined almost 2 percent annually during 1981-85, while food imports continued to increase 
but at a slower rate than previously (4 percent per year). According to Shapouri and Rosen (1986), 
four primary reasons account for this trend: variation in export earning, growth in credit, 
govermnent policies, and slow production growth. They found, among other things, that import 
capacity was the most significant variable in explaining the level of food imports and, in turn, it 
depends on export earnings and the availability of credit. They also found that cereal imports have 
become a significant contributor to the overall levels of availability. 
In the case of Iran, the increasing dependency on food imports over domestic production to 
meet food demand can be traced back to the influence of oil revenues in agricultural and food policy. 
The relationship between changes in oil export earnings and agricultural imports during the 1970s and 
1980s was analyzed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for 1969 to 1988 for selected oil 
exporting countries. The results are reported in Table 5. For Iran, a 1 percent increase (decrease) in 
the price of oil implies a 0.889 percent increase (decrease) in agricultural imports. The study also 
indicated that changes in the price of crude oil alone accounted for about 90 percent of the change in 
Table 5 Elasticity of agricultural imports with respect to nominal oil 
rices 
Country Elasticity 
Algeria 0.827* 
Indonesia 0.552* 
Iran 0.889* 
Iraq 0.968* 
Mexico 0.824* 
Nigeria 0.846* 
Saudi Arabia 1.011* 
Venezuela 0.673* 
* Denotes statistical significance at p < 0.001. 
SOURCE: USDA, 1986. 
R- squar 
0.95 
0.89 
0.94 
0.94 
0.89 
0.87 
0.89 
0.92 
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value of agricultural imports for all the countries in the study. This strong link between agricultural 
imports and oil price suggests the proclivity of oil exporting countries to satisfy their domestic food 
demand more with imports rather than domestic production. Consequently, the need to expand 
agricultural production is significantly reduced. Moreover, in the case of Iran, the government was 
under no political pressure from established large landlords to provide the means to increase 
agricultural production. The oil revenues allowed the government to defuse the power of landlords 
by purchasing their land for redistribution to landless farmers under a land reform program of the 
1960s (Shafaeddin, 1988). Figure 2 shows the trend and fluctuations of Iranian wheat production and 
imports for 1960 to 1991. 
However, this response of the government to imbalances in food supply and demand cannot be 
sustained over a prolonged period. The variability in oil revenues presents a major challenge to policy 
makers in managing the food supply (domestic production + imports) in the country. Oil revenues in 
Iran in 1990 were 10.6 percent more than targeted, and were 14.4 percent less in 1989, 9.1 percent 
less in 1991, and 20.6 percent less than targeted in 1992. An even more serious problem is the 
possibility of future foreign exchange constraints. Furthermore, too much dependence on foreign 
suppliers for basic commodities like food may subject the country to food embargoes for political 
reasons. For these economic and political considerations, the government of Iran attempted other 
alternatives to reduce or ultimately eliminate the food production-consumption gap by intervening in 
the agriculture sector both to boost and stabilize production. The major forms of intervention 
included direct investment in agriculture and pricing policies intended to provide production 
incentives. 
Agricultural Price Policy in Iran for Wheat 
Government intervention in agricultural price policies has a long history in MENA. For 
example, the Iranian government instituted wheat and barley price controls in 1916. The aim of the 
intervention was to prevent severe fluctuation in the prices of these commodities in the interest of the 
city dwellers. In fact, like many developing countries, Iran's price policies were consumer-oriented 
until recently. Some governments have impeded the output growth for cereals through their output 
pricing policies. Indeed, some believe that this is the cause of the food gap. The argument holds that 
if only government could "get the prices right"-specifically, permit cereal prices to rise to the world 
level-the food gap would shrink dramatically (Richards, 1987). But, finding the right producer and 
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consumer price is a difficult challenge. For one, the government has to balance conflicting objectives 
and interests and the informational requirements are tremendous. 
The actual result of the pricing policies in Iran indicates some bias towards the consumer at the 
expense of turning the terms of trade against agriculture. Agricultural products are sold for a fixed 
price that is determined by the government while the price of nonagricultural goods are determined in 
the market and are free to rise in response to market forces. A study by Shafaeddin (1988) covering 
the 1965 to 1977 period, indicates that the terms of trade deteriorated against wheat and this 
deterioration was exacerbated by government wheat trade policies. For instance, whenever the 
wholesale wheat price (WPIW) declined, as in 1966-68, due to a good harvest, the government did 
not make any attempt to support it by increasing its purchase. Ironically, it even exacerbated the 
situation by increasing supply, niainly from subsidized wheat imports. In contrast, whenever the 
wholesale price tended to rise, as in 1963-65 and 1972-74, it supplied wheat to the market in 
relatively large quantities (Table 6), causing the wheat price to increase less than it would have 
otherwise. Table 6 also demonstrates that the increase in the official sale price was sluggish 
compared with the wholesale price of wheat (WPIW), and that the government's sale price rose 30 
percent against 100 percent for the WPIW, from 1959 to 1977). 
When considering the importance of the government sale in relation to production, the 
government sale policy (unlike its purchase policy) has had a significant dampening effect on the 
wholesale price. Wheat purchased by the government as a percentage of total production in 1974 
reached only 2.5 percent but the net government sale represented a larger share in relation to wheat 
consumption, 22 percent in 1974. The wholesale price of wheat is constructed on the basis of prices 
generated in the private trading of wheat (representing the part of demand not satisfied by 
government's sale). The nominal protection coefficient (NPCs) is often used to show the degree of 
producer price support by government. In the MENA region only four countries (including two oil 
exporting countries) had a wheat NPC greater than 1 in the 1971 to 1981 period (Table 7). 
Specifically, in late 1976 in Iran, farmers received approximately 10 rials a kilogram for wheat, an 
amount mildly regarded as adequate to cover the cost of cultivation. At the same time, the 
government was paying 18 rials a kilogram for imported wheat (Looney, 1983). Also, the prices set 
by the government did not reflect the higher prices of factors of production such as fertilizer and 
machinery. For example, between 1970 and 1977, the price of fertilizer rose by about 28 percent and 
that of tractors by 51 percent (Central Bank, 1978). 
Table 6 Data on wheat domestic purchase and sale by the Iranian 
government 1955-77 
Official prices wholesale price 
index of wheat 
Year Purchase Sale purchase sale (WPIW) 
( 1000 tons) (rial/tons) 
1959 36.5 162.5 5000 6200 100 
1960 12.2 177.7 5000 6200 105.8 
1961 127.4 263.5 5000 6200 105.4 
1962 56 201.7 5000 6200 113.2 
1963 133.9 161.7 5000 6200 103.9 
1964 7.1 257.7 5000 7510 121.9 
1965 15.5 334 5000 7510 130.8 
1966 197.2 241.9 5000 7510 114.6 
1967 246.3 400 5000 7510 93 
1968 244.7 53.3 5500 7500 86.5 
1969 9.3 101.6 5500 6730 101.1 
1970 3.7 310.6 5500 7510 122.2 
1971 0.8 804.4 5500 7510 138.4 
1972 5 524.8 6300 7510 118.5 
1973 3.1 593.7 6500 7510 127.1 
1974 116.2 1370.8 8000 7510 204.1 
1975 496.7 1553.8 9000-10000 7510 166.9 
1976 793.9 1641.8 9000-10625 7510 171.4 
1977 980.5 2000 11000-1200 8008 200.9 
SOURCE: Shafaeddin(1988). 
Table 7 Currency overvaluation and average producer prices for wheat 
Index of Currency 
Country Overvaluation 
1971-1981 
Average Producer Official 
Exchange Rate 
(US$/ton) 
Algeria 178 127 
Egypt 174 79 
Iran 120 110 
Iraq 118 88 
Jordan 1 01 102 
Libya 143 165 
Morocco 104 141 
S.Arabia 99 235 
Sudan 181 137 
S~a 1~ ~ 
Tunisia 115 103 
Turkey 125 91 
SOURCE: Richards and Waterbury, 1990. 
Price of Wheat Using 
Market Exchange Rate 
(US$/ton) 
71 
45 
92 
74 
101 
115 
136 
237 
76 
87 
90 
73 
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After the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the government's setting of wheat price was the most 
important ingredient of its agricultural price policy. The objectives of wheat pricing were to 
encourage production by increasing the producer price on the one hand, and to subsidize bread for the 
urban population on the other hand. It is expected that this policy will help the country to achieve 
self-sufficiency in wheat for food and national security goals. 
As in many other countries, the Iranian government's control over agricultural prices is partial 
and lopsided. At one extreme, wheat price is effectively controlled by the government, while at the 
other extreme, fruit and vegetable prices are left to market forces. This structure in government 
pricing and the presence of inflation has led to wheat prices lagging behind other prices. Therefore, 
not only has agricultural profitability declined, but also the relative prices (internal terms of trade) 
within agriculture have turned against staple food grains. This may lead to more variation or to a 
decline in domestic grain production. 
The governments in food-deficient developing countries, and especially when there is a decline 
in foreign exchange reserve and/or possible long-run instability of export earnings and inflation, may 
be forced to raise the administered prices of grains (wheat) to offset increases in farm production cost 
and to restore production incentives and stabilize domestic production. However, more often than 
not, inflation quickly erodes the incentives, and the cycle repeats itself. 
This cycle in grain pricing policy can be clearly seen in the case of wheat prices in Iran. Before 
the Revolution, particularly after the first oil shock in 1974, when wheat imports almost doubled, the 
government increased the price of wheat substantially. But since the price was kept constant for the 
next two years despite high inflation rates, the real price of wheat declined sharply. Then the imports 
that had decreased in 1976 began to rise again in 1977. In response, the government increased prices 
by about 20 percent, but this was too little, too late, and the real price of wheat continued to decline. 
After the Revolution, the price of wheat was raised again, but the increases could not match ongoing 
inflation. So, by 1980, the relative price of wheat was falling and imports were rising. In 1981 and 
1983, the price of wheat was increased by 40 percent and 30 percent, quickly restoring profitability in 
wheat, but each time the price increase was followed by an effective price freeze, so that relative 
gains were quickly lost to inflation (Mojtahed and Esfahani, 1989). The relative price index in Table 
8 indicates that the price of wheat has been lagging behind other agricultural prices. To provide 
adequate incentives it is vital for the price policy in Iran not only to avoid the stop-and-go scheme, 
but also to consider the profitability of production. For example, under two different methods of 
wheat production-semi-mechanized and traditional-the yield and production costs are different. 
Table 8 Farmgate price of wheat offered by the Iranian government 
Year 
Farmgate nominal price 
of wheat 
(rials/kg) 
Index of price of wheat 
relative to : 
consumer Wholesale 
prices prices 
(rials) 
1973 5.5 63.3 n.a. 
1974 10 100 100 
1975 10 91 98.1 
1976 10 78.2 79.7 
1977 12 75 82.2 
1978 14 79.3 81.9 
1979 18 91.6 80 
1980 20 82.1 61.6 
1981 28 94 72.5 
1982 30 84.5 68.5 
1983 40 95.7 76.5 
19~ ~ 00.6 ~ 
1985 40 83.2 57.1 
1986 46 79.5 n.a. 
1987 48* n.a. n.a. 
* In 1987, in addition to the price of 48 rials per kilogram, in-kind prizes 
were also offered to farmers for delivering their wheat to the government. 
SOURCE : Mojtahed and Esfahani, 1989. 
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Therefore, in 1984 when the administered price of wheat was 30 rials, the traditional producer lost 2 
rials per kilogram, while other producers made 9 rials profit. 
Finally, two factors have become important in recent years in wheat production: (1) increasing 
price (e.g., the official wheat price ranged from 53.0 rials per kilogram in 1988 and had increased to 
225.0 rials per kilogram by 1992), and (2) reforming the price policy system from fixed price to 
guarantee price (the government guarantees to purchase wheat and agricultural products at prices that 
are announced every year). 
In comparing the performance of price policies in pre-revolution and post-revolutionary Iran, 
Mojtahed and Esfahani indicate that, after the revolution, the overall terms of trade have turned in 
favor of agriculture. However, these grain price policies are the main cause of cereal production 
fluctuations much more than total crop production in recent years. Moreover, Richards mentioned 
that domestic production fluctuation, not price instability, is the main source of food insecurity both 
globally and in the MENA region. 
A Causality Analysis of Oil Price, Wheat Production, 
and Wheat Imports in Iran 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), "food security has three specific 
aims: ensuring production of adequate food supplies, maximizing stability in supplies, and securing 
access to available supply on the part of those who need them." Internal and external factors 
influence food availability and, thus, food security at the national and regional levels. In this section 
we consider and test the relationship between two important components of food security, wheat 
production and imports, and the price of oil, which plays a vital role in all major oil exporting 
countries. 
Formal investigation of the relationship among variables affecting food security is necessary for 
policy purposes. Causal relationship cannot be determined from standard statistical methods. For 
example, finding a high correlation among variables does not necessarily imply the presence of a 
causal linkage among them. It can be spurious-that is, their correlation may actually be due to a 
third factor. On the other hand, functionally (in a nonlinear fashion) related variables may be 
uncorrelated (a linear measure of functional relationship). Hence, we explore the causal relationship 
between wheat imports, as a important component in food availability, and wheat domestic production 
and oil prices in Iran. The method employed for analyzing causal relationship is based on the concept 
of Granger Causality, developed by Granger (1969) in his paper entitled "Investigating Causal 
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Relations." The idea is: a time series process X "causes" another time series {Y} if, by 
incorporating the past history of X, one can improve a prediction of Y compared to a prediction based 
on the history of Y alone. 
This notion of causality has spawned a vast and influential literature. For example, 
macroeconomic studies of Granger causality have included investigation of the causal relationships 
between money and income, between wages and prices (see Feige and Pearce for a review of these 
studies), and between GNP and energy consumption (for instance, Abosedra and Baghestani, 1991). 
Since cause is a loaded term, to avoid misunderstanding some people use other terms such as 
precedent as suggested by Leamer (Maddala, 1988), and interpret Granger Causality as meaning 
knowledge of X (t) increases one's ability to forecast Y(t + l) in a least squares sense (Conway et 
al., 1984). About ten years after his initial paper, Granger introduced a distinguishing title for his 
definition and concept of causality, which is quite different from the general use and logically correct, 
from alternative terms, by suggesting that be called Granger Causality (Granger, 1980). 
Assessments of Granger Causality have both practical and theoretical value (Freeman, 1982). 
Indeed, in economics, tests for this kind of causality are becoming recognized as essential steps in 
building a model (Sargent, 1981). 
Operationalization and Testing 
For a bivariate case, consider jointly stationary processes X andY. Let all past values of X, 
and Y, be denoted by x,y and all past and present values of X, and Y, be represented as x and y. 
Also, define r? as minimum prediction variance1. There are number of ways to define causality. 
Four of the most popular cases are presented here: 
Y Causes X : r? (X, I Yt , x, ) < r? (X, I x, ) 
Y Causes X instantaneously : r? (X, I y, , x, ) < r? (X, I Yt , x, ) 
Feed Back: Y Causes X and X Causes Y. 
Independence : r? (X, I y, , x, ) = r? (X, I x, ) = r? (X, I Yt , x, ) and 
r? (Y, I Yt ' x, )= r? (Y, I Yt) = r? (Y, I x, ' Yt) 
Three tests of causality have been proposed within Granger's definition of causality: (1) the 
Direct-Granger test, which is based on his definition and applied as a one-sided distributed lag; (2) the 
Sims (1972) approach, based on a two-sided distributed lag; and (3) a cross-correlation between the 
residual series method suggested by Pierce and Haugh (1977). 
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The Granger and Sims tests are theoretically equivalent (Doan, 1992), and as Freeman pointed 
out, the Pierce-Haugh technique is really a test for independence only. The properties of variants of 
these three tests of causal direction have been studied by, for instance, Geweke, Meese, and Dent. 
All studies indicate the Direct-Granger test is preferable to the Sims and Pierce-Haugh tests of 
causality (Abosedra and Baghestani, 1991). 
Among the problems associated with the Direct-Granger method, however, is the need to choose 
a sufficient lag length for the right side of the autoregressive representations of a bivariate system: 
m n 
(1) 
1 1 
m n 
L A.iYt-i + L lijXt-j +E:2t (2) 
1 1 
If an insufficient number of lags is chosen, there is likely to be serial correlation in the residuals and 
therefore, a biased hypothesis test (Feige and Pearce, 1979). Another difficulty with this technique is 
that estimated residual in the test equations ( 1) and (2) are assumed to be independent. If this is not 
the case and e1, and e2, are contemporaneously correlated, the Zellner-Aitken generalized least 
squares regression estimating simultaneously these two equations provides results that are similar to 
those of the Direct-Granger method (Cuddington, 1980). 
Empirical Evidence 
To use the standard Direct-Granger causality test, we specify a set of two unrestricted equations. 
We explore the causal linkage between oil price (OP) and wheat imports (M) by using equations (3) 
and (4). And equations (5) and (6) are used to detect the causal relationship between domestic wheat 
production (Q) and wheat imports (M). 
m n 
L OliMt-i + L l3jOPt-j +E:lt£ (3) 
1 1 
m n 
OPt ~ L A.iOPt-i + L lijMt-j + E:2t (4) 
1 1 
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m n 
L Ci iMt-i + L i3j0t-j + ill t (5) 
1 1 
m n 
L >--iOt-i + L ojMt-j + ~-'2t (6) 
1 1 
To test for stationarity of these four time series we applied a Dicky-Fuller test. The results indicate 
that only domestic production of wheat (Q) is a stationary process. To eliminate the problem of time 
series serial correlation and "spurious regression" all three nonstationary processes are transformed 
into first -order difference form. We use the domestic production level of wheat, both with and 
without a time trend. 
We applied these unrestricted equations to the Granger causality test for the two pairs of 
variables for Iran covering the period 1964 to 1991. Since our data are annual, such test equations 
might be misspecified if there is a significant causal relationship with a lag length of less than one 
year between the variables. To overcome this possible problem, it is more appropriate to use the 
Direct-Granger test in the form suggested by Feige and Johannes; that is, we add the current value of 
independent variable in right side of test equations (run for j > 0). 
The null hypothesis that oil price (OP) does not cause wheat imports (M), OP M, is tested by 
examining the joint significance of the coefficients on N past OP in equation (3). To test OP does not 
cause (M) at all (i.e., including contemporaneously), we examine the joint significance of coefficients 
on OP and N past OP in equation (3). To test whether wheat imports do not cause oil price we use 
equation (4) in the same manner. A lag length of 2 for independent variables is chosen (n = 2) for 
equation (4). This is deemed adequate since annual data are used, and to ensure enough degrees of 
freedom for better precision of estimates. However, in Tables 10 and 11, since Q needed no 
differencing, the lag length can be increased up to 3 to accommodate more dynamics in the model 
(different lag lengths are tested, but not reported here). 
Table 9 reports the calculated F-value for (a) OP (M) does not cause M (OP), (b) OP (M) does 
not cause M (OP) "at all." Note that F(A) refers to the F-statistics for the "at all" causality test (i.e., 
when considering both the lagged and the contemporaneous variables), and F(S) refers to strict 
causality test; that is, when one just considers the lagged variables. 
Table 9 Direct- Granger causality F -test 
Causality : From oil price to wheat import 
····················································································································································· 
no. of lags in null F(A)a F(S)a K' D-h I tb 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ I ] OP not cause M 3.28 (2, 23)** 4.40 (1, 24)* .23 1.081-
[ 2 l OP not cause M 2.24 (3, 2J)C 2.71( 2, 22)** .21 NC I 1.82d 
Causality : From wheat import to oil price 
.................................................................................................................................................................................. 
no. of lags in null F(A)a F(S)a II' D-h I tb 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 1 l M not cause OP 1.50 (2, 23) .98 (1, 24) .03 NC I .53 
[ 2 l M not cause OP .91 (3, 21) .58 (2, 22) .07 NC I .78 
a F(A) refers to the causality F- statistics for the "at all" causality and F(S) refers to the strict causality test. Degrees 
of freedom are given in parantheses. 
b Adjusted R-squared and D-h (Durbin- h) and !-values are from the unrestricted test equations. 
c F- critical value at I 0% level is 2.36. 
d NC indicates that the Durbin- h statistic can not be computed. 
• Significant at the 5 percent level. 
•• Significant at the I 0 percent level. 
23 
An examination of F(A) and F(S) in the first panel in Table 9 indicates the presence of a 
unidirectional causality from oil price to wheat imports ( OP => M). In other words, the past and 
current and also past history of oil price help predict wheat imports in Iran. The latter appears to 
have a stronger causal linkage than the former. Examination of the second panel suggests no 
relationship between oil price and wheat imports when the past and present information is considered, 
but there is a unidirectional causal relationship from oil price to wheat imports when we consider past 
information of oil price only. 
The results of the Direct-Granger test, relating domestic wheat production (with a time trend) 
and wheat imports for alternative lag lengths, are summarized in Table 10. These results suggest the 
presence of strong linkage from wheat production to wheat imports when both the contemporaneous 
and lagged variables are considered. Examination of F(S), however, suggests no causation between 
the two variables, for all different lag structures. The current effect from Q to M seems to be 
significant in all cases. The structure of Table 10 is the same as Table 11, except the level of Q is 
detrended 2 
Again, the examination of F(A) indicates the presence of a strong bidirectional (feedback) 
causality from Q toM. In comparing Tables 10 and 11, on the basis of the F-statistic values, the 
effects from domestic production of wheat to wheat imports appear to be more pronounced than when 
we use a detrended time series value of Q. 
Since the data for oil price includes three shocks-1973, 1979, and 1983-we apply the Chow 
test to explore whether there are any structural changes in the coefficients. The results indicate that 
causality tests are not sensitive to sample periods. For testing serial correlation, since the test 
equations include lags, Durbin-his used. In any case where this test could not be computed, we 
applied an alternative test called m-test. Based on the reported D-h or t-value for the m-test, in 
Tables 9, 10, and 11 there are no serial correlation problems in the unrestricted test equations. 
Conclusion 
Using the Direct-Granger causality test, we have presented evidence that there is a unidirectional 
causality relation from oil price to wheat import in the strict and instantaneous sense in Iran. 
In other words, the past and present history of oil prices are useful information to improve the 
prediction of wheat imports. The past and current history of domestic production of wheat (with and 
without a time trend) is useful to improve the prediction of wheat imports, but this is not the case 
when we just consider the past history of domestic wheat production. As Feige and Johannes 
Table I 0 Direct- Granger F- Test : Domestic wheat production process with time trend 
Causality : From Wheat Production to Wheat Import 
no. of lags in null F(A)a F(S)a 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2] [Q not cause M] 5.04 ( 3, 20)** 2.14 (2, 21) 
[ 3 ] [Q not cause M] 4.44 ( 4, 17) * 1.60 (3, 18) 
Causality : From Wheat Import to Wheat Product 
no. of lags in null F(A)a F(S)a 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2 ] [M not cause Q] 3.40 ( 3, 20) .37( 2, 21) 
[ 3 ] [M not cause Q] 3.16 (4, 17)** .47( 3, 18) 
* Significant at 5 percent level 
* * Significant at I percent level 
II' 
.51 
.53 
II' 
.78 
.70 
D-h !tb 
-1.00 
NC/1.14 
D-h /tb 
NC I .14 
NC 1.59 
Table 11 Direct- Granger causality F -Test : Domestic wheat production process without 
time trend 
Causality : From wheat production to wheat import 
no. of lags in null F(A)a F(S)a ][' D-h /tb 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2 l [Q not cause M] 4.62 ( 3, 20)* 1.72 (2, 21) .49 NC /0.19 
[ 3 l (Q not cause M] 3.52 ( 4, 17)* .99 (3, 18) .48 NC /2.17 
Causality : From wheat import to wheat production 
no. oflags in null F(A)a F(S)a ][' D-h /tb 
ind. variables hypothesis 
[ 2] [M not cause Q] 3.91 ( 3, 20)** .96( 2, 21) .27 NC /0.91 
[ 3 l [M not cause Q] 2.98 (4, 17)** .52( 3, 18) .31 NC/2 
* Significant at the 5 percent level 
* * Significant at the 1 percent level 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Prediction variance. Given a two variables regression model, Y1 = a + (3X1 + E 1 t = 1, 2 
..... ,T and E 1 - N (0, o2). If assume a and (3 are known, the appropriate forecast for YT+l 
is given by YT+l = E(YT+l) =a+ (3XT+l• the prediction (forecast) error is ~+l = YT+l-
YT+l). This prediction error has two desirable properties: (a) E~T+l) = E(YT+l- YT+l) = 
(-ET+l) = 0 and (b) the prediction error variance is the minimum variance among all possible 
forecasts based on linear equations (see Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991). 
2. The time series Q, is a trend-stationary process (TSP) (not a difference-stationary process 
(DSP). A TSP can be represented as Y = a + (3t + E 1). Deterending involves subtracting a 
(linear) trend (Y- (3t =a + E 1), in order to obtain a stationary process (Lloyd and Rayner, 
1993). 
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